

Review of **INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

POLITICS • ECONOMICS • LAW • SCIENCE • CULTURE

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New Stimulus for Economic Co-Operation with U. A. R.

— Establishment of joint Committee for Economic Co-Operation —

By Danilo KEKIĆ

It is well-known that political relations between Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic are very good, friendly and close. Such relations are, undoubtedly, beneficial to both countries. At the same time, they are of great importance for the struggle of the progressive forces in the world for peace and cooperation among nations.

Parallel with development of close political relations between Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic, cooperation has developed and strengthened between them in other fields too, especially in the economic field. One of the characteristics of the two countries' economic cooperation is its extension to an increasing number of spheres and the continuous strengthening of mutual economic relations as a whole. Trade exchange, in particular, has been increasing at an extremely fast rate. If we take 100 as the index number of the volume in 1956 then the index reached in 1959 was 300, and in 1960 580. It would be hard to find many examples of such a fast rate of increase in trade exchanges between two countries.

The movement of trade exchange, though an important indicator of the development of economic relations between

the two countries, is not the only one; for cooperation has also been expanded in other fields of economic life. Thus, cooperation in the fields of agriculture, technical assistance, industry, building activity, etc. has developed continuously to the satisfaction of both partners.

Particularly lively and extensive activity is being carried out in the field of industry. On the basis of an agreement of January 10 this year, an extensive programme of industrial cooperation between Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic has been initiated. So far, contracts have been signed providing for the building of several industrial plants and for a delivery of mining equipment to the U.A.R. The most important of projects is a factory to be built by Yugoslav enterprises. Cooperation between Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic in the economic field is characterized by a unanimity of interests and long-term prospects. This cooperation is not only the desire of the two governments, but is an objective necessity of the national economies of both countries. The favourable possibilities for the implementation of this coope-

VOLUME XII APRIL 20, 1961

NUMBER

265

B E O G R A D

Published by
THE FEDERATION OF
YUGOSLAV JOURNALISTS

Chief Editor and Director
MILORAD MIJOVIĆ

Price per copy 20 cents
Issued twice a month

ration are the result of the unquestionable fact that, in principle, the two countries have identical views with regard to the character of international cooperation in general, and cooperation in the economic field in particular and these are full equality of the partners and a consistent respect for the interests of both sides. Apart from this, there also exist basic material conditions for the implementation of this kind of cooperation.

In the light of these facts, and with a view to the further expansion and intensification of their friendly relations and economic cooperation, the governments of Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic have agreed to establish a joint committee for economic cooperation. The committee was set up and its first session held in Cairo from March 10 to 23 this year. Its basic and main task is to work for the further advancement, expansion and strengthening of cooperation between the two countries in all fields of the economy. It is to give special attention to the development of trade, industrial, scientific and technical cooperation.

In the course of the first session of the committee, four sub-committees were formed with the aim of defining the forms of further cooperation. In the sub-committee for industrial cooperation, agreement was reached with regard to the possibilities and need for intensive and long-term cooperation in the field of industry. The two countries' representatives in this sub-committee suggested that the industries of the two countries should constantly seek new concrete and suitable forms of cooperation. With this in view, it was agreed to form a joint bureau for industrial cooperation. The task of this bureau would be to study and encourage conditions for the

implementation of the agreed relations between the competent industrial organizations and definite enterprises in both countries with the aim of establishing new industrial enterprises in the U.A.R. and expanding production in the existing enterprises. The bureau would also be concerned with the furthering of the exchange of raw materials, semi-finished and finished products, the study of the market and the industrial production of the two countries with a view to export, arrangements of the exchanges of experts between the two countries etc. The setting up of the bureau will make it possible to plan coordination and cooperation between the two countries' industries in the interests of their faster and more stable development. Similar initiatives were put forward in the other sub-committees.

This time too, the work of the Committee and its sub-committees confirmed objective possibilities and mutual willingness for the further comprehensive development of economic relations between the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia. As regards definite problems — those already existing and those that may appear in the course of work — they will be duly dealt with and solved, thanks to the existence of an organized mechanism of mutual economic cooperation (the Committee, the subcommittees and the bureau).

The establishment of the Committee for Economic Cooperation between Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic is undoubtedly a new stimulus for even more intensive economic cooperation between the two countries. It will also be a guarantee for the implementation of bilateral economic cooperation on the principles upon which the two countries have based their foreign policies.

President Tito's Visit to Morocco and Tunisia

By L. ZDRAVKOVIĆ

The second stage of President Tito's present tour of Africa started on April 1, when the Galeb, on which he was travelling, put into the port of Casablanca, where thousands of Moroccans had prepared an enthusiastic welcome for the Yugoslav President, whom they saw, not only as the leader of a friendly country which had extended its sincere support to Morocco in the course of her struggle for independence, but as an outstanding champion of the African people's sovereign rights, and of peace and equal relations among all nations of the world.

The significance of the President's visits to Morocco and Tunisia in the course of his African tour is manifold. The talks he had there with the leaders of these two north African countries will undoubtedly contribute to the common struggle against the vestiges of colonialism and all forms of neocolonialism in Africa, and for equal relations among states on the basis of mutual respect and non-interference in one another's internal affairs. Personal contacts and exchanges of views with King Hasan of Morocco and President Bourguiba of Tunisia followed as a natural result of friendly relations and fruitful cooperation between Yugoslavia and her neighbours across the Mediterranean, who are now passing through the same difficult experiences Yugoslavia went through in her

struggle for the preservation of independence and the liquidation of economic backwardness.

Morocco and Tunisia have passed through the same phases of development in the course of their history. For many years they existed within a single state organization — the Barbary Empire. In more recent times, the French Protectorate left its own traces, and created the similar problems which face these two young states today. As component parts of Maghreb, Tunisia and Morocco are closely linked with Algeria's struggle for her final liberation from the colonial yoke, and their own prosperity vitally depends upon the country's independence and free development.

Sultan Mohamed V of Morocco, who died recently, was an outstanding fighter for his country's independence and emancipation, and ensured for Morocco an important place in international relations. Morocco's internal policy and particularly her foreign policy, have not undergone any major changes with the succession to the throne of his son, King Hassan II. Founded on the basic needs and interests of Morocco, the country's foreign policy is increasingly directed toward cooperation with all nations of the world, uncommitted countries in the first place.

Throughout his stay in Morocco, President Tito was constantly aware of the support the broadest masses of the population gave to this policy. The statements made during the visit, and particularly the official communique issued after it, pledged the adherence of Yugoslavia and Morocco to the struggle of the colonial peoples, called for the elimination of foreign interference in the Congo, expressed support for the cause of the Algerian people, condemned the arms race, and urged friendly cooperation among all countries, both big and small, in the interests of world peace.

After Morocco, President Tito's mission took him to Tunisia, where the citizens and President Bourguiba greeted him as a sincere friend and the eminent representative of an independent policy.

Immediately upon gaining independence, Tunisia was confronted with vast problems arising from the need to organize the country's internal life in face of a backward economy and the shortage of trained personnel. Enjoying the support of the Neodestour Party, President Bourguiba was able to mobilize entire nation for the construction of the country. The prolonged presence of France had, to a great extent, put the Tunisian economy in a dependent position in relation

to the French economy, a fact which was felt to be an obstacle not only to the country's development but to efforts to consolidate its independence. That is why President Bourguiba immediately embarked upon the nationalization of the basic branches of the economy and of the large agricultural estates. Agrarian reform and the buying up of land from French settlers were carried out.

President Tito's visit to this country and his meeting with President Bourguiba and other Tunisian leaders will go down in history as a new contribution to the strengthening of cooperation among peoples, and particularly to the development and further deepening of bilateral relations between the two countries.

The talks President Tito had with King Hassan and President Bourguiba, the leaders of the two independent countries in North Africa, marked the beginning of a new stage in relations between Yugoslavia and Morocco and Tunisia, a stage in which their cooperation, having now received a fresh impetus, will extend to new fields and exert a favourable influence on their common struggle to ensure peace and progress throughout the world.

ONE PER CENT

By Janez STANOVNIK

Industrially advanced countries should set aside at least one per cent of their national incomes every year to aid underdeveloped countries. This claim, which was made by the United Nations General Assembly at the end of last year, is now being discussed in many quarters and seems to have resulted in a growing awareness of the duty of the developed countries to assist the underdeveloped ones.

How much is one per cent?

If we take the industrially developed countries to be all those whose per capita national income stands at or above 400 dollars, then the definition covers the United States and Canada, Western Europe including the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and most of Eastern Europe, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa. These countries together account for approximately 25 per cent of the world's population, and among them have an annual income of about 1,000 milliard dollars, or nearly 80 per cent of the world's entire income.

If the one-per-cent proposal were put into effect, the underdeveloped countries would receive about ten milliard dollars annually in foreign aid.

What is the extent of current assistance to underdeveloped countries?

If we assume that the underdeveloped countries are those with a per capita income of under 200 dollars, we should count among them most of the countries of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, South-East Asia and the Chinese People's Republic. These extensive areas, with a total population of milliard and a half, which is more than 50% per cent of the

earth's population, have at their disposal only 150 milliard dollars annually, or a bare 12 per cent of the gross world income.

The figure of 5 milliard dollars is most frequently mentioned as the present amount of assistance to underdeveloped countries. It is taken to include bilateral and multilateral loans and gifts, private investments and credits which the Soviet Union has recently granted. This figure, however, should be examined more closely.

An estimate by the United Nations Secretariat has put the entire international assistance in 1958-59 (gifts, credits, financial arrangements through international institutions) at 3.3 milliard dollars. It must be said at once that the amount includes France's 214.5 million dollar "assistance" to Algeria and the Sahara. It must also be noted that it is often impossible to separate what is called "defence support" from economic and technical assistance. At any rate, the amount of assistance purely for economic development is much lower, perhaps even half the quoted figure.

The estimated 5 milliard dollars includes private capital exported to underdeveloped countries. Private capital investments, estimated at one to two milliard dollars per annum, do not, however possess the stability that can be expected of international financing. It should be noted that the conditions under which this capital is exported are hardly such as to warrant the use of the word "assistance". Accounts demonstrate that each year underdeveloped countries pay out to the creditor states about the same amount, that is to say, between one and two milliard dollars, in the form of interest and dividends.

Even if the mentioned figure is not analysed, the estimate by the United Nations Secretariat makes it clear that in the period between 1957 and 1959 the advanced countries allotted only 0.39 per cent of their average gross national product to the underdeveloped countries. The developed countries should, accordingly, increase their present contribution by one and a half times in order to reach the modest goal of "one per cent".

How much do the underdeveloped countries aid the developed ones?

Statistics are, unfortunately, chiefly concerned with capital exported by developed countries to underdeveloped ones, whereas the flow in the opposite direction is seldom so carefully registered.

This however does not obscure the fact that there is a steady outflow of considerable funds from underdeveloped into developed countries, partly in the form of interest and dividends, as we have already mentioned.

Less obvious is the "assistance" which underdeveloped countries extend to industrial states in the form of low prices of raw materials. The loss in this way of even only one per cent of the real value of the exports of these underdeveloped countries amounts in terms of capital to more than the entire bilateral and multilateral international assistance which they receive. At the time of the last recession, in 1957—58, the underdeveloped countries lost, not one per cent, but a full six per cent compared with real prices (prices of industrial goods) and since 1954 their losses have constantly been in excess of three per cent. In other words, all international aid in recent years has been merely an inconsiderable return of the profits which the industrial countries have made through the low prices they paid for raw materials imported from underdeveloped countries.

When the outflow of short-term capital from the underdeveloped countries into more "secure" financial centres, which is particularly characteristic of the Latin American countries, is taken into consideration, it becomes clear that the assistance of the underdeveloped countries to the advanced ones is disproportionately greater than the movement in the opposite direction.

Is one per cent too much of a burden?

It is often remarked that taxes in the industrial countries are already high enough, and that the imposition of further taxes to finance assistance to underdeveloped countries amounting to one per cent of the national income would be too great a burden. International assistance — in the widest sense — means a charge of only ten dollars on the average American citizen, who earns more than 2,500 dollars annually. The average Briton, whose gross annual earnings are over 1,200 dollars pays 3.5 dollars for this assistance, whereas the average German making 1,000 dollars a year contributes less than three quarters of a dollar, which is below 0.1 per cent.

Over 12 milliard dollars are spent in America today on advertising alone, and it is inconceivable that this country could not set aside 4 milliard dollars for world progress. West Germany's expenditure on the printing of misleading articles and news reports about underdeveloped countries, for instance, exceeds one per cent of the national income. If Belgium made available for economic development only part of the sums

she spends on financing Chombe, Kalonyi and Mobutu and their vile activities in the Congo, her contribution could soon rise from 0.11 per cent of the national income, as at present to almost one per cent.

It is difficult to understand the objection that the contribution of one per cent of the national income as assistance to underdeveloped countries would be too great a burden when one considers that this obligation would fall on those parts of the world which share 80 per cent of the world's income. The average per capita income of the population in the industrial countries amounts to 1,400 dollars, while the average per capita contribution as assistance to underdeveloped countries is 5.55 dollars. The picture is completely different on the other side of the fence. The underdeveloped countries with an average annual per capita income of under 100 dollars, such as Bolivia, Pakistan, Burma, Afghanistan, Indonesia, India, Ethiopia and others, received in 1957—58 and 1958—59 only 1.55 dollars per head in foreign aid, while the average for all underdeveloped countries in those years was 1.91 dollars per head; 1.55 dollars out of 1,500 is no great burden, whereas an additional 1.55 dollars to a modest income of 200 dollars in the underdeveloped countries would mean a lot.

Should the "one per cent" be an obligation for non-colonial countries too?

The attitude in some quarters is: Let those who profited in the past from colonial exploitation pay now.

The assuming of the international obligation of extending assistance to backward countries does not imply the introduction of the principle of restitution. No compensation can be made to those who suffered slavery or lost their lives in revolt against colonialism. The present cannot change what the past has written in the book of history.

The question today is not who is guilty and who is not, but rather who can help and who is not able even to help himself. Contemporary economic progress is largely due to technical advance. The achievements of the sciences, however, belong to the entire human race and are not a monopoly of any one country. That is why it is everybody's duty to ensure the benefits of modern progress to those who were denied them in the past through no fault of their own.

What "one per cent" means for underdeveloped countries

One per cent of the national income is a comparatively small sacrifice for the developed countries, but it would be of considerable assistance to the underdeveloped countries: for the developed countries only one per cent of a high income, but for the underdeveloped countries seven per cent of a very low income.

By making the utmost effort, the underdeveloped countries today invest about seven per cent of their national income annually. To contribute one per cent would actually mean doubling investments in these countries. And whereas they are now developing at the rate of one per cent annually — for a large part of these investments are the result of the demographic rise — increased international assistance would raise the rate of economic development to three per cent.

However, economic development cannot be viewed in terms of simple arithmetic. It is true that misery today breeds tomorrow's still greater misery, but it is equally true that progress will mobilize forces at present inactive. Increased international assistance would enable the underdeveloped countries

to put their economic and human resources to a more effective use. This international assistance combined with domestic resources would foster a process of economic fermentation, and lead these countries from their present stagnation along the road of rapid progress.

How the "one per cent" should be granted

To increase assistance to the underdeveloped countries is not, naturally, the full answer to the question. A more important point, perhaps, is how this assistance is to be given. The underdeveloped countries have frequently complained of the attempts from abroad to tutor them. If there is a genuine desire for foreign aid to rally the domestic economic forces, it is

important above all for the peoples of these countries to determine by themselves the way in which their own countries will be built. Otherwise foreign assistance will be used for building "foreign oases", as was the case during colonial rule.

Perhaps no greater confusion is to be found anywhere today than in the field of international assistance to underdeveloped countries: IBRD, IDA, IFC, DAG, DLF, ODF, FIDES, etc., etc. — there is no end of the agencies engaged in this kind of activity. A United Nations agency, SUNFED, has recently been set up and its statutory committee appointed. One of its prime tasks will be to establish order and coordination in this field.

EVIDENCE

White Paper on Albania

— On the Albanian Government's hostile policy towards Yugoslavia

By R. KOZARAC

The White Paper on the Albanian Government's hostile policy towards Yugoslavia, which has appeared at the right moment to show the international public the various aspects of a dangerous and unpacific activity which is becoming increasingly intensive and aggressive, is a document of outstanding importance. It is full facts which, ranging from 1948 to 1961, throw light on the hostile policy of the Albanian Government has persistently pursued against Yugoslavia, and on the unrelenting efforts of the Yugoslav Government to settle and normalize mutual relations.

The White Paper opens with a section dealing with the causes of the tension between Yugoslavia and Albania, in which it is shown that the relations between the two countries have been in a state of permanent crisis which, in recent years, has become increasingly developed and aggravated, and which reached one of its peaks at the Fourth Congress of the Albanian Worker's Party. Synchronized from one centre, it is reflected in an intensive propagandist campaign against Yugoslavia, in interference with her internal affairs, in the organizing of extensive spying, destructive and subversive actions against Yugoslavia's national sovereignty and state integrity, in the obstruction of all aspects of bilateral co-operation, in the attempts to spoil Yugoslavia's relations with third countries, in the hampering of the normal work of the Yugoslav diplomatic staff in Tirana, in the persecution of Yugoslav citizens resident in Albania — in a word, in all aspects of relations with a neighbouring country. To conceal these destructive and dangerous methods and the aggressive objectives of their policy towards Yugoslavia from their own public and from the world, the Albanian leaders systematically misrepresent historical facts in the relations between the two countries and fabricate monstrous calumnies about Yugoslavia. Although these efforts are too transparent and too devoid of originality to serve their purpose, they constitute, along with poorly concealed

or distorted facts, a source of serious danger to relations between the two countries. They are poisoning and deteriorating the relations in the Balkans and restoring the atmosphere of the cold war in international relations.

Since July 1, 1948 when twenty-seven bilateral contracts, agreements and arrangements with Yugoslavia were cancelled on one side, and the short and insincere interlude in 1956 (when Enver Hoxha declared: "We have admitted that we were deluded just as were the other Communist and Workers' Parties, by the slanders against Yugoslavia"). The Albanian leaders, under the slogan of the struggle against Yugoslavia "revisionism" have undertaken a number of ventures which, even, though given here only in part, surpass all that has been recorded in the history of international relations:

— From April 18 to December 31, 1958, the Albanian press published 527 anti-Yugoslav articles and Radio Tirana broadcast more than 420 anti-Yugoslav reports and comments;

— during 1959 and 1960 the highest Albanian leaders made 145 attacks on Yugoslavia (ranging from New-Year messages to speeches in agricultural co-operatives and toasts at diplomatic receptions in other countries of the camp);

— in special centres at Tirana, Skadar, Kukse, Piškopeja, Podgradec, Tropoja, Korča and Libražde, agents are trained for subversive, destructive and spying actions against Yugoslavia: from 1948 to September 1960 675 saboteurs and agents were smuggled in groups and singly into Yugoslavia, and from the beginning of 1957 to the end of February 1961 115 agents of the Albanian intelligence service were sentenced at public trials;

— since 1948 the Albanian frontier organs have killed or wounded 34 Yugoslav frontier guards and perpetrated 615 frontier incidents and acts of trespass on Yugoslav territory, as well as other hostile acts against Yugoslavia;

— in less than two years 16 groups of armed saboteurs and terrorists have infiltrated into Yugoslavia;

— the highest state and party leaders of Albania have directly participated in organizing subversive actions against Yugoslavia and such tasks have been performed also by Yugoslav deserters and criminals who fled to Albania;

— Chicanery of all kinds, brutal physical attacks on Yugoslav diplomats in Tirana, and lack of the elementary conditions necessary for the functioning of the Yugoslav diplomatic staff in Albania, are witnessed by the fact that from 1954 to 1960 the Yugoslav State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs and the Yugoslav Legation lodged more than fifty written and oral protests with the Albanian Government, and requested that it should observe the generally accepted international norms in relations with the diplomats of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (the Yugoslav Legation is kept under open police supervision, its telephone lines with other diplomatic missions in Tirana are constantly disturbed, Yugoslav diplomats and members of their families are rudely assaulted in the streets, the Yugoslav mission is deprived of the regular services which the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Albania is bound to ensure to diplomatic representations, medical help is withheld etc.);

— Yugoslav citizens resident in Albania are exposed to all kind of terror, ranging from dismissal from their posts to imprisonment and sentencing to hard labour or death;

— how far this hysterical, chauvinistic campaign against Yugoslavia has gone is witnessed by the digging up of the Yugoslav military cemeteries of the First World War, by the demolition of the headstones etc.

The most voluminous section of the Paper — on Yugoslav-Albanian relations from 1948 to 1961 — contains 82 documents, mainly extracts, with the most characteristic examples of the permanent hostile evolution of the Albanian policy towards Yugoslavia.

The first section speaks of the grave crisis in mutual relations. It recalls the words of Enver Hoxha on October 5, 1947: "What a fate our little nation would have suffered without democratic and friendly Yugoslavia." It mentions the decree published on July 1, 1948 that all Yugoslav experts, advisers and specialists were to leave Albania within 48 hours, and closes with the article in "Zeri i populita" of March 12, 1961, saying that in the interests of the purity of Marxism the Albanian Party would fulfil its international duty, up to "the complete ideological and political destruction of this band of traitors, as recommended by the Fourth Congress of our Party, and as recommended by the Moscow Conference of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties held in November 1960".

The second section deals with the statements of the highest state and party leaders of the People's Republic of Albania and the propaganda against Yugoslavia, ranging from falsification of the facts of the mutual relations up to 1948, appeals to the Yugoslav people to overthrow their legitimate government, accompanied by interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia and attacks on her national sovereignty and territorial integrity. ("The Belgrade revisionist group headed by Tito is the representative of the poisonous Greater Serbian chauvinism in the service of American imperialism" or "We do not ask today for the incorporation of Kosovo into Albania. But the mother that bore us also bore the Albanians in Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia"), and false presenta-

tion of Yugoslav foreign policy (the Yugoslavs have taken over the devilish role of wreckers and agents of destruction on an international level", President Tito's journey to the African countries has an anti-Soviet and antisocialist character", to the instigation of the Albanian people to hatred for Yugoslavia, and to outrages against the people and government of Yugoslavia (in Albania herself and in the camp countries China, the U. S. S. R., Czechoslovakia, Hungary etc.)

The third section contains documents on subversive and destructive acts, from which it appears that the persons sent by the Albanian state organs to Yugoslavia were given the following tasks: 1) to disseminate irredentist propaganda among Yugoslav citizens in the border regions of Yugoslavia for the incorporation of the Autonomous District of Kosovo and Metohija into Albania, 2) to organize and carry out acts of sabotage in Yugoslavia — to be shown in Albania as acts of the Shiptars in Kosovo and Metohija — in order to instigate a campaign against Yugoslavia on this basis, 3) to work actively among the Albanian political emigrants in Yugoslavia, and to organize them for hostile acts against Yugoslavia, 4) to instigate people to flee to Albania in order to show the Albanian public that the population of Kosovo and Metohija is dissatisfied with its situation and status in Yugoslavia 5) to organize among the Shiptars in Yugoslavia individuals or groups to work for the Albanian police, 6) to collect and submit data on the Yugoslav People's Army and Militia and to undertake other espionage. The documents include statements by saboteurs and agents, sentenced in Yugoslavia about the work of the centre for anti-Yugoslav acts of violence in Podgradec, a border town, on instructions they received from the highest functionaries of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of Albania and from party functionaries for destructive acts of the manner of their recruiting, the attempts to stage anti-Yugoslav trials etc.

The fourth section deals with the obstruction of the normal work of the Yugoslav diplomatic staff in Tirana. In this section passages are quoted from the notes sent to the Albanian government (on May 15, 1954 to protest against the violation of the immunity and extraterritorial status of the Legation and the unlawful confiscation of movable and other property of the Legation, on March 6, 1958 to request the abolition of the measures of pressure on Yugoslav citizens and of discriminatory measures against the Yugoslav Legation etc.) as well as the statement of the Yugoslav Government on the reduction of the personnel of the Legation in Tirana to the indispensable minimum, until the Albanian Government should show readiness to change the present situation.

The fifth section is devoted to the position of Yugoslav citizens in Albania and contains extracts from the notes of March 6, 1958 and September 1, 1958 (in which the settling of Yugoslav citizens in other places and rendering impossible for them to be repatriated to Yugoslavia was protested against). In 1958 alone, besides numerous oral protests, the Yugoslav Legation was compelled to address eight notes to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Albania, on account of the ill-treatment, arrest and group imprisonment of Yugoslav citizens, and the hampering of the Yugoslav Legation in exercising its legitimate function of protector of the interests of Yugoslav citizens with permanent residence in Albania.

The sixth section illustrates the efforts of the Yugoslav Government to settle relations with Albania. In the note of November 2, 1949 the Albanian Government was invited to return to the policy of friendship and co-operation with Yugo-

slavia. At the UNO General Assembly in September 25, 1950, Edvard Kardelj proposed in the name of the Yugoslav Government the conclusion of an agreement on lasting peace and non-aggression with each of the neighbouring countries. In a note dated September 9, 1960 the Albanian Government was requested once again to cease its hostile actions against Yugoslavia. But the Albanian Government continued its policy, not only rejecting the Yugoslav initiative but intensifying the anti-Yugoslav campaign in all directions.

A special section of the White Paper deals with Yugoslav-Albanian relations up to 1948. The material it contains not only indicates the friendly relations which had existed between the two countries until the Cominform attack, but also the unnatural and monstrous volte face by the Albanian leaders in their relations with Yugoslavia — proclaiming her overnight no longer the most unselfish and closest friend but the greatest and the most dangerous enemy.

At the beginning of this chapter the aid rendered by the Yugoslav People's Liberation to the Liberation Struggle of the Albanian people during the Second World War is recalled. (letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania, quotations from Enver Hoxha's articles, passages from the reports of delegates in Albania of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia etc.). The next section deals with Yugoslavia's help in getting Albania internationally recognized (the support of the Yugoslav delegates for Albania's admission to the United Nations Organization, the text of the contract on friendship and reciprocal aid between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of Albania, the cables and speeches of the Albanian statesmen in connection with this contract etc.). Then there follow data about the assistance given by the Yugoslav People's Army to the Albanian Army, and documents relating to Yugoslavia's economic assistance to Albania up to 1948. (the text of the Contract on coordination of economic plans, on the tariff-agreement and on the equalization of the currency between Yugoslavia and Albania, various official statements and other texts).

Of the tables appended to the White Paper three illustrate the scope of Yugoslavia's aid rendered to Albania from 1945 to 1948: the first table contains a list of the equipment and material delivered to the Albanian Army (116 heavy guns, 55 howitzers, 102 mine-throwers, 486 tommy-guns, 51 machine-guns, 3,050 automatic rifles, 7,410 rifles, 21 tanks, 243 automobiles, about 80,000 anti-tank and land mines, 124,000 tunics and 124,000 trousers, 50,000 army coats, about 80,000 pairs of shoes, about 40,000 metres of cloth for uniforms, about 400,000 articles of soldiers' underwear etc.), the second table contains data on the training of Albanian military cadres in Yugoslav military schools (all charges for this training were debited to the budget of the Yugoslav People's Army; the number of senior officers trained was 470), while the third table shows the sums due to Yugoslavia from the Government of the People's Republic of Albania up to 1948, totalling 2,331,149,284 dinars.

Based on facts which completely reveal the methods and ends of the initiators and leaders of the hostile policy of Albania towards Yugoslavia over a period of twelve years, the White Paper lays bare the real meaning of the "ideological" campaign against Yugoslavia, which is not waged only by Albania or the People's Republic of China, which are the leaders of the anti-Yugoslav attacks, but is now growing sharper in other countries of the socialist camp, as shown by the latest criminal


affair concerning Živojin Bulat, a Yugoslav diplomat in Prague. In the White Paper it has come clearly to light that "universal" documents such as the Moscow Declaration, and the various camp meetings, serve only as fresh inspiration for intensifying the anti-Yugoslav campaign in Albania, and that the Albanian leaders find direct encouragement and unmistakable support in the statements of official personages and in propagandist texts published in other countries of the camp on the topic of "Yugoslav Revisionism" for their policy, which means the total negation of the socialist spirit and of the principles proclaimed of foreign policy in the camp. The example of Albania is an irrefutable proof of the inconsistency between phrases about co-existence and socialist internationalism, and practice which endangers the interests and sovereign rights of Yugoslavia, and constitutes a grave menace to world peace.

The Yugoslav Government, pledging itself for a peaceful settlement of all pending issues, on the basis of equal rights and non-interference, as well as for normal relations with all countries, especially with neighbouring ones, emphasizes also in the White Paper its readiness to endeavour to the best of its ability to normalize relations with the People's Republic of Albania. To achieve this aim, the Yugoslav Government considers the following steps to be undertaken by the Albanian Government as indispensable:

- The cessation of hostile propaganda against Yugoslavia, especially of subversive actions against her state integrity;
- the observance of the UNO Charter and of the generally accepted norms of interstate behaviour in its relations with Yugoslavia;
- the abolition of discriminatory measures and the enabling of the Yugoslav diplomatic staff to work normally and smoothly;
- the cessation of all other actions which obstruct the normalization of reciprocal relations.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic is deeply convinced that this would serve not only the vital interests of the peoples of both countries, but also promote co-operation among the nations in the Balkan area, along with the interests of peace and peaceful co-operation among states, an aspect which ought to be taken into account by every government which is aware of its responsibility to the international community.

THE TIRANA METHODS



— Comrade Enver, the fellows are ready for the ideological fight!

Co-Existence and the Struggle for Peace-According to China

By V. TONKOVIC

At the recent session of the Executive Committee of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Berlin, Liu Tshang Sheng, the Chinese delegate, appealed to the other delegates to wage battle against the Federation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia, as the chief "enemy" of the international unity of the working class. Absurd as it is, this appeal is neither a new nor an isolated event in the Chinese leaders' international activity. The same appeal was made a year ago at the session of the Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peking, where it was accompanied by gross pressure from the Chinese on the other delegates to impel them to adopt the Chinese resolution. At the recent meeting of the Committee of Solidarity with the Youth of Algeria, which took place in Stockholm, the Chinese delegate showed the same hostility towards the youth of Yugoslavia, and tried to prevent the election of the Yugoslav representative to the Secretariat of the Committee of Solidarity. The actions of the Chinese representatives at the International Students' Council, where they did not refrain even from voting against certain constructive actions of the International Students' Council as a whole, only because they demanded the participation of Yugoslav students, are well known too.

All this is the reflection of the same continuous policy of the Chinese leaders, of which hostility towards Yugoslavia is only an external manifestation and symptom while its essence lies in the hegemonic and intolerant forcing of its conceptions and views on the International Workers' Movement. It is a well-known fact that relations with Yugoslavia was not the only question at these sessions which demonstrated the intolerance and obtrusiveness of the Chinese delegation. They insisted on their own viewpoint and also on other issues such as, the struggle for peace, the struggle against imperialism etc. where they try to impose their own conceptions, often without taking into account the interests of the unity and solidarity of all the progressive forces in the mentioned organizations. In fact this Chinese policy is by no means new either in these organizations or in the International Workers' Movement. The same wish for ideological monopoly, for the obtrusion of one's own concepts as the only correct ones, was well known in the time of Stalin when such a policy caused heavy damage to a number of international organizations by estranging them from the working class and the progressive forces in the world. The subordination of different international progressive movements and organizations to certain state interests, which was the motive power of this policy, can easily be perceived in the present case, by analyzing the Chinese concepts. The consequences of the renewal of such methods and policies in various international organizations can be still more detrimental in the conditions of today, at a time when most of these organizations have only began to get rid of this burden of the past.

The Chinese attitude at the sessions of the Executive Committee of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Berlin

and of the Committee of Solidarity with the Youth of Algeria in Stockholm shows that there have been no substantial change in the course or methods of the Chinese delegates since last year. Still, there is a certain difference between the recent Chinese declarations and those of 1959/60, which dismayed the world public by hardly concealed glorification of war as a means for the elimination of world antagonism. The statements that war is inevitable, that devastation caused by war is not important since "the victorious nations will create an exceedingly rapid pace a thousand times better civilization on the ruins of imperialism" etc., are now relegated to second place. In all probability, this is not only because the Chinese leaders did not succeed in imposing, in the expected and desired measure, such a course upon the conference of eighty-one Communist Parties in Moscow, but also because they realized to a certain extent, that this policy was not accepted by the International Workers' Movement or the world public. Actually only six Trotskyites of the "Fourth International" were enthusiastic about it. In the statements of the Chinese leaders and in the Chinese press support for peaceful co-existence, for the strengthening of peace etc. is now frequently expressed and it is even emphasized that China was the first to put forward the "five principles" of peaceful co-existence, and she has consistently observed these principles in her relations with other countries. These statements, which should be welcomed in any case are, however, strangely at odds with certain practical moves in Chinese foreign policy, including the actions of the Chinese delegates at international conferences. Viewed through the prism of this practical activity, such statements on the acceptance of co-existence can be interpreted only as referring to the kind of co-existence that corresponds to Chinese concepts, to the struggle for peace conducted in a manner that suits Chinese state interests.

This activity on the plane of foreign politics raises the justified question: is this sincere acceptance of co-existence and the need for the preservation of peace; or are both being used for tactics and political slogans? This question is still more pertinent for the reader of Chinese editorials and articles about international issues, which have recently begun to warn up more and more frequently the old Chinese theses that war is inevitable, that it is an illusion that anything can be settled by negotiation, and the like. In these articles, just as before the negative attitude to the possibility of co-existence is concealed by pseudo-revolutionary phrases such as "we Communists are of the opinion that a world war will probably break out if imperialism is allowed to provoke local wars of aggression and thus obtain what it wants. We firmly support the righteous revolutionary wars which are conducted by all oppressed countries and peoples and we are resolutely against and are prepared to prevent unrightful and counter-revolutionary wars of imperialists and reactionaries." ("The Red Flag" organ of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, January 1, 1961) It is characteristic of these articles that the

inevitably lay emphasis on war and on the use of force as a means for the solution of world problems, while the importance of negotiation and peaceful settlement of open questions is inevitably passed over in silence. They keep warning that "one should have no illusions about imperialism nor should one trust it") as if the nations in the world did not see clearly enough themselves where the true imperialist forces are), while they do not say a single word about the need for creating confidence among all the forces in various countries that are actually interested in the discontinuation of the cold war and wish to solve controversial questions by negotiation.

There are other examples of contemporary Chinese political practice which may serve to show the extent — if any — to which the Chinese conception of co-existence has evolved. It is needless to point out that the Chinese government does not wish, for instance, to "co-exist" with socialist Yugoslavia, and that in consequence of the one-sided Chinese actions the relations between the two countries are completely frozen up, except "the last remnants" of trade exchange and the maintenance of severely limited diplomatic representations. But the Chinese leaders have obviously been looking for an opportunity of exerting more direct pressure on "Revisionist Yugoslavia", and have found it in Enver Hoxha's Albanian government, which has engaged itself to the utmost extent in provocative acts of violence against Yugoslavia, thus creating a permanent atmosphere of cold war in the Balkans. The Chinese leaders go so far in supporting Enver Hoxha as to welcome immediately and sanction loudly every new Albanian

provocation against Yugoslavia. Moreover, it has become a regular practice for Chinese delegations to pay visits to Albania and hold anti-Yugoslav meetings with Albanian functionaries at places near the Yugoslav border, which is probably unique in international annals. Thus the Chinese leaders have — in spite of the great distance between China and Yugoslavia — found in Enver Hoxha's government — which is conducting a campaign against Yugoslavia for the sake of its own, well-known ends — the same instrument for direct pressure on Yugoslavia as were Rakoshi and others in the hands of Stalin. The perniciousness of this Chinese activity (which is not always isolated, at least as far as Yugoslavia is concerned) and the grave consequences to which it may lead, need no comment.

By its various actions in 1958/59, especially by the pressure on its borders, the Chinese government has aroused strong suspicions as regards its intentions, not only in Asia but in the world in general. The belligerent articles of "The Red "Jen Min ji Bao" on the occasion of Lenin's anniversary in 1960, certainly did not allay these suspicions. Thus, the complaints of the Chinese leaders that Chinese foreign policy has been "calumniated" and "detracted" does not sound convincing, as people judge by what they see and hear themselves. If the leaders of Chinese policy intend to carry on the present practice in international relations (we have quoted only a few, conspicuous examples of this practice) they should not be surprised if the Chinese version of co-existence and "the struggle for peace" does not enjoy much credit in the world.

Freezing of the German Problem

By L. ERVEN

In West Germany it has been realized with an unpleasant shock that the new American Government does not attach such primary importance to the German problem as the old American administration did. President Kennedy who, in his first message to the Congress, talked about important and acute international problems, omitted the German problem and the question of Berlin. Nor in his later statements did Kennedy treat the German question as one with which to start the new period of consolidation and of realistic approach to outstanding issues. No shifting of concepts was observed, but the fact was noted that in the complexity of mutual contradiction this problem was regarded somewhat differently on both the Western and the Eastern sides than was the case before.

The German problem was already marked with all the characteristics of one of the strongest factors of the cold war in the first postwar years, when ideological conflicts between East and West were growing sharper. In view of the political and strategical importance of Germany's central situation in Europe, the blocs did not allow one another to strengthen their positions in the whole of Germany through their social systems. The consequence was that the first and provisional division of occupied Germany into zones hardened into the division of Germany into two parts, in which the forces of the corresponding line and bloc were respectively favoured;

and this led to the gradual forming of two German states. They were organized with separate state administrations and laws; they obtained wider or narrower international recognition, and were included in the political systems, military alliances and economic associations of one bloc or the other. While the problem of Germany's unity was never removed from the agenda of international discussion, a fact which served only for the further straining of international relations, the organization of two German states was put into practice and improved. All plans for the simple uniting of Germany, according to methods which ignored this development, became, as time went on, more and more abstract, and their only influence on international politics was to render the normal consolidation of political conditions in Europe more difficult.

In the first years, when these plans were being made, Germany was the territory of a defeated country, whose state apparatus had been destroyed, and which was occupied and controlled by the Allied Powers. These powers had to decide on how Germany should be reorganized, but they could reach no agreement, and it was due to this that the development of events took a different course. With the appearance and stabilization of the separate German states, the German political and administrative apparatus, relying on its own material forces, was organized, and the German political and social forces, which became an independent factor of the German

policy no longer under the absolute control of their allies, as was the command of the occupying forces, were formed and confirmed. Hence the German problem became complicated, not only because of the conflict between the forces that should have agreed, but also because of the conflict between the German states, which should have been united.

Until recently the German problem, as if by tradition, has been at the top of the list of pending and acute international problems. It was to have occupied that place at the abortive Paris Summit Conference of last year. But in fact its primary international importance has steadily decreased. The pressure on the international situation caused by the contradictions inherent in this problem has gradually been relaxed. Two events on the Western side have marked two stages of the declining interest in the urgent solution of the German problem, though these events may not have been its cause. One was the death of Foster Dulles, which meant the end of the American policy of persistent and uncompromising insistence on the dead formulae of the cold war. The other appears to have been Kennedy's election to the office of President of the United States. The Kennedy Administration may not yet have evolved a new formula for the German problem which would greatly differ from Eisenhower's, but it undoubtedly holds a different view of the acuteness of this problem.

There are similar indications on the Eastern side that — although there are no changes in conception as to the manner of solution of the German problem — its urgency is not so greatly insisted on, neither is it regarded as one of the first problems to be tackled, in the interests of the international situation.

This change of the place and the rank of the German question in outstanding international issues can be explained in several ways.

One is that the German problem — to use a medical term — has become chronic. This does not mean that it is now less serious or less complicated, but that the danger always present in an acute case, in politics as in medicine — is less.

It is more and more realized, even in quarters where it is persistently denied, that a new situation has been created and stabilized in Germany, and that the former solutions, devised when there was no such situation and when conditions were different, can no longer be applied.

This accounts for the fundamental change in the nature and essence of the German problem as an issue of international politics. This problem arose from the difficulties encountered between the Allies in connection with the Peace Treaty with Germany. The German case has broken the tradition of ending wars with peace treaties by which defeated states were reinvested with legality from the point of view of international law, and by which their constitutional elements in the domain of international law were defined. But on the territory of Germany all the essential conditions of a peace treaty were first actually achieved and then internationally recognized, before and without the conclusion of such a treaty. Two German governments were formed which — though lacking mutual or general international recognition — act for the German people and in international politics as such.

Today these are states which maintain diplomatic relations with others. They are the allies of their former conquerors and equal partners in their political, military and economic groups. In a sense, the classical conception of the peace treaty and its effect has in the German situation become an anachronism in diplomatic practice. The relation itself which, according to this practice, exists between the contracting partners, has

changed. There are no victorious or defeated parties, but equal partners in negotiation. Consequently, the solution of the German problem must be approached in a new way, taking the factual state of things as the point of departure. The danger inherent in this problem lies less in the conflict between the conceptions of the blocs, and more in an attempt to use methods of force, according to the old formulae, in its solution, irrespective of the situation created on the terrain itself.

The other change is in the altered nature of the question of the union of Germany. This union — if we leave aside its declarative and propagandist aspects — was of great interest to the Western Allies as long as there was a conviction among them that there was a realistic chance, at least to some extent, that it would be possible of achievement within Western Germany's framework and according to her type of constitution. This interest has now weakened in two ways. First of all, the development of events and political institutions in Germany, which brought into existence two different German states, has rendered it impossible to achieve such a type of German union. In the West, the unrealistic character of such a combination is being realized more and more, hence the weakening of interest. In the second place, the new situation, the power and the resources Western Germany has attained within her present boundaries, and the prospects created by this development, have begun — whether admittedly or not — to constitute problems for her allies, so that probably there is not sufficient incentive for the Western Allies to insist on speeding up the forming of a greater Germany. Besides this, Western Germany is already included in the system of the Western powers to such an extent that any solution of the German question outside the existing, and already established and accepted framework, would bring confusion into the whole system of Western policies. Thus the question of German union, which was formerly regarded as the basic German problem, has become more and more an internal matter concerning the German people. From the point of view of international policy and the relations between the great powers, the German problem implies the accommodation of the latter's own interests and policies to this development of the German question and its fitting in the international order of guaranteed peace and security in Europe.

These changes in the essential features of the German problem, and in its influence on international politics, account for the fact that its solving is no longer so acute as it has been especially in periods of strong international tension. But other events which have taken place in the meantime, other courses of international policies and the increased importance of other problems, have also contributed to this. The most outstanding of these problems are disarmament, with the ever graver aspect of progress in the application of atomic power; the ever more important problem of co-operation in the exploration of outer space; the problem of the underdeveloped countries and the liquidation of colonialism — to enumerate only those that are attracting the most eager attention of political leaders and the international public. These questions have relegated to the second place the importance that was attached to the German problem when it served as a whetstone to sharpen relations with a view to strengthening bloc military formations. Today in the face of such fateful problems as those mentioned, the task of international policy is to eliminate or at least to adjourn controversies which, like the German question, are fraught with the danger of creating new tension in international relations.

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
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
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
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The "JUGOSTROJ" factory was founded in 1929, while since 1938 it has been producing refrigeration installations. The activity of this enterprise embraces the following: designing, manufacture and mounting of all kinds of refrigeration installations; designing and manufacture of hydraulic installations — hydrophones and centrifugal pumps; designing, manufacture and mounting of equipment for industrial refrigeration plants and slaughterhouses, ice-producing plants and other installations for the foodstuff industry; designing, manufacture and mounting of equipment for industrial enterprises; designing, manufacture and mounting of air-conditioning and ventilation installations.

The year 1954 witnessed a change over of the "JUGOSTROJ" factory exclusively to the manufacture of machinery and refrigeration installations. The enterprise has been assured the necessary material and financial means so as to ensure delivery of home produced parts of the equipment for the refrigeration plants, and also to develop the enterprise into a quite independent producer of complete refrigeration installations, thus freeing the country from imported equipment.

"JUGOSTROJ" manufacturing assortment can be divided into two basic groups:
— Commercial refrigeration installations
— Ammonium refrigeration installations as well as machines.

The commercial refrigeration installations include the following serial products: refrigerators of all sizes, refrigeration boxes of both closed and open types, counters for cooling and dispensing beer, ice-cream counters, commercial compressor units and other products. The designs of these products are quite modern, while the very best materials are used for their manufacture.

The ammonium refrigeration installations include air-cooled refrigerators of the standing, ceiling and wall types in various sizes and of varying capacities; pipe snakes for low temperatures; special refrigerators for deep-freezing; condensers (of various types); complete installations for ice-producing plants etc. The manufacture of ammonium compressors for normal conditions and of two-grade compressors for low temperatures of various capacities is in preparation.

The "JUGOSTROJ" factory is preparing the manufacture of complete equipment of various types for self-service restaurants. Such equipment is manufactured with the licence of a French firm.

"JUGOSTROJ" likewise produces special refrigeration installations at the request of buyers, and also special refrigeration installations for health purposes.

The factory "JUGOSTROJ" is rapidly developing. In 1955, it produced 456 tons of refrigeration installations, while the year 1960 witnessed a total of 1,200 tons of such installations.

Affirmation of African Solidarity

By N. DUBRAVČIĆ

The Third African Conference, which was held in Cairo from March 25 to 31, marked a significant stage in the process of revolutionary emancipation and political maturing of the African peoples. Compared with the two previous conferences of the leaders of the free African states — in Accra in December 1958 and in Tunis in January 1960 — which indicated the beginning of an organized association of the liberation movements, and the outlining of the first steps towards all-African unity, the Cairo meeting constituted a radical step ahead in the development of a common African policy, and clearly formulated the aims which this policy should accomplish. The essence of the decisions adopted at the meeting in Cairo was that they confirmed the strong determination of the African peoples to take the affairs of their continent into their own hands and to secure for it an equal and proper place in the international community.

The Cairo conference proclaimed that the only path leading to the accomplishment of this aim was the unification of the African peoples on the basis of a uniform programme of action which would help them overcome the difficult problems hampering the peaceful development and independence of their continent. This shows that the majority of the African countries are fully aware of the fact that the internal unity of Africa is the best guarantee for her survival and final victory over the undertakings of the neocolonial powers and over the various separatist and opportunistic activities carried on and supported on African soil by foreign elements. Those negative aspects of African policy, manifested in dissociation from the general anti-colonial struggle of Africa, were defeated and condemned in Cairo as a means used by the neocolonialists in their efforts to preserve their old positions and create new strongholds in the African continent. Africa can resist the powerful colonial and neocolonial pressure exerted against her, whether in a synchronized manner or through individual actions, by the USA, West Germany, Belgium, Holland, France and other powers, only by the force of her unity and her independent political individuality.

Just how much Africa has advanced over the past year in developing a unanimous attitude with regard to her needs, tasks and chief opponents, is also illustrated by the ratio between the number of countries and delegates represented at the conferences in Cairo and Tunis. Whereas 18 African countries took part in the conference in Tunis in January 1960, the conference in Cairo was attended by 34 countries. Also the resolutions adopted in Cairo were distinguished by greater political maturity and more radical orientation. The most important of the resolutions passed were those providing for practical, organizational measures for the association

of the African peoples, with the aim of following a common policy in all fields.

The conference requested the setting up of all-African bodies as permanently active organs of the integration, such as a consultative African council to work out a common foreign policy; a committee of African experts to coordinate the economic policy for the whole of Africa, this being the first step towards economic unity; a committee of military chiefs to draw up plans for the joint defence of the continent; information agencies for all African countries and corresponding bodies in the fields of the trade unions, transport, sport, etc.

At this, their third joint consultation, the representatives and leaders of the independent African countries expressed the highest possible degree of solidarity with regard to the need for more effective and greater assistance to the liberation struggle of the people of the Congo, Algeria, the Cameroons and all those African territories that have still not freed themselves from a colonial or semi-dependent status. The attitude adopted towards the United Nations Organization corresponds to the need that all the African countries should be adequately represented in the main bodies of the World Organization.

The resolute and mature decisions of the conference are a truthful reflection of the revolutionary process towards independence in Africa. The consolidation of their independence is a paramount problem, which presents itself to the liberated nations of Africa variously: in political, economic, social, educational and other aspects. There is no doubt that the African nations can best solve this problem if, regardless of their mutual differences and affinities, they pool their energies, material and spiritual resources, and efforts.

The affirmation of the political independence of Africa is also a factor which decisively alters the system of relations in the world society and the international disposition of forces. As a powerful bastion of the policy of peace, independent Africa is increasingly becoming an element of primary importance for the establishment of equality in international relations and an instrument of universal progress.

At the conference in Cairo representatives of free Africa expressed these precise ideas on the international role and responsibility of their policy of refusing to join any of the existing bloc groups. It is essential for the cause of world peace and international cooperation that the powers which are today trying to make Africa turn from her historical path should understand the African reality, and adapt their attitude to that continent to the requirements of our time. They would be both wise and farsighted to do so, for this is the only way in which they could preserve at least some respect in Africa and ensure cooperation with the African countries in their own interest.

The New U.S.A. Campaign against Cuba

By N. OPAČIĆ

In territorial size Cuba belongs among the small countries, but the significance of events which are taking place around her has made her the scene of important occurrences whose bearing cannot be confined to the narrow belt surrounding her national boundaries. As a symbol of the national awakening of Latin America from its economic backwardness and political lethargy, Cuba has become a kind of spectrum or lens, in which not only the basic economic, social and national problems of the Latin American continent but the whole complicated network of contradiction and conflict between this continent and its mighty northern neighbour, the U.S.A., are reflected. The fact that, after Cuba, Brazil, the largest country in this area, has shown a determination to stand on her own feet and to voice the elementary aspirations of her own people, proves that the natural process of the profound changes which are taking place in other parts of the world — in Africa and Asia — through the anticolonial struggle and the movement towards freedom, independence and equality, cannot by-pass Latin America.

There were hopes that the new American administration would approach this political fact determined by history and the needs of our epoch, with more responsibility and understanding. It is true that Kennedy had not either in the days of his nomination for the presidential candidate or after his coming to the White House, shown any sign that the attitude of the U.S.A. towards Cuba or her revolution would undergo any constructive evolution. But from certain symptoms of "adaption" which were said in Washington to indicate a transition to a more realistic assessment of the problems of the underdeveloped parts of the world, it was believed that the aggressive pressure on Cuba would be replaced by a policy of accommodation and by seeking a solution through negotiation. Numerous Latin American nations — Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico, Venezuela and Bolivia — also made efforts in this direction, i.e., to settle the conflict between Washington and Havana in a peaceful way. Such an outcome would have been useful not only for the stabilization of peace in Latin America but also for the improvement of international relations as a whole.

These hopes, however, received a severe blow some days ago, when the State Department, with the consent of the White House, released a strange document, unusual in diplomatic history — a White Paper on Cuba. To define the nature of this document, which bears the character of an official declaration of the American government, it is sufficient to point out its pretension to determine the framework and limits of the Cuban revolution and to pass judgement on the legal government of a sovereign country. The conception of such a document which it may be remarked, is completely lacking in any imagination or originality, because it confines itself to hackneyed phrases about "the danger of communism", shows that it means more than the usual bullying and pressure, more than a war of nerves or a propagandist declaration. In its essence, it is an open appeal to overthrow the Castro regime; it is a proof that the American Government is actively

engaging itself in the preparation of unlawful actions against Cuba, with the use of armed force.

In one sense this act is unprecedented but not because it contains threats and the ambition to impose its own formula of the internal regime on an independent country, for similar acts and pretensions are often shown in the policy of the big powers. It is unprecedented for its unconcealed frankness in publicly avowing these intentions, and popularizing them. In this case, the declaration of the State Department constitutes open interference with the internal life of a free and sovereign country, for it prescribes in peremptory tones how this country should live and what it must and must not do. That the USA Government wishes to persuade both its own and the Latin-American public that Cuba is being a base of Soviet influence and infiltration in the southern belt of the western hemisphere, and that the overthrow of Castro's regime would not mean the destruction but the salvation of the revolution, is no justification for, in the general context of the document, this sounds like an excuse for possible further still graver anti-Cuban actions.

While the State Department wishes to offer, by this document, an ideological platform for action against Cuba, the American press conspicuously demonstrates the support of its government for the so-called Liberation Army which is being recruited on the territory of the U.S.A. and trained for the invasion of Cuba. Not only have official circles failed to deny reports of the military preparations of the Cuban counter-revolutionaries in Louisiana and Miami, and at the recruiting centres in New York and in Florida, but Cardona, the president of the so-called Cuban Revolutionary Council, has paid an official visit to Washington and consulted the State Department.

After the economic blockade and a series of discriminatory acts against Cuba, this latest campaign of the U.S.A. Government has again brought about tension in the Caribbean area by creating a situation which can be rightly described as a danger to peace.

This preaching of aggression and spreading of a psychological war against an independent country belongs to the category of unpermitted actions which must be strongly condemned by the United Nations.

It would be dangerous indeed if this world organization allowed every big power to play with smaller countries as it wishes and to alter their way of living and internal systems according to its own taste.

It remains to be seen whether and to what extent this attitude towards Cuba can be brought into harmony with President Kennedy's announced intention, in consideration of the needs and claims of Latin America, to correct the policy which his predecessors conducted towards this region. The White Paper is a document which proves that the policy of the new president has not stepped out of the traditional line in this field. In the eyes of the Latin-American, African, Asian and other people throughout the world this fact may cause irreparable damage to the reputation of the United States.

Increased Trade with the U.S.S.R.

In the coming five years, economic co-operation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union is expected to increase to a considerable extent. The volume of the exchange of goods between these two countries from 1961 to 1965 is expected to be double compared with 1960.

This development of economic exchange is planned in the new Yugoslav-Soviet Five-Year Trade Agreement, which was signed in Belgrade on March 30, along with a protocol on exchange of goods in 1961. One of the conspicuous features of the new agreement is the favourable structure of the exchange. In the Yugoslav imports from the U.S.S.R. raw materials and semifinished goods figure with 50 per cent, while in the Yugoslav exports to the Soviet market industrial equipment holds a significant place. The Yugoslav shipbuilding industry will construct in the coming five years fifteen tankers (of 25,000-ton capacity each) and nine cargo ships (of 10,000 tons each) while other branches of industry will deliver 3,500 tank-cars, a great number of transformers and electrical goods, universal dryers, and complete fruit and vegetable processing plants, for the needs of Soviet Union. The Yugoslav exports will also include cables, lead, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgical products and various chemicals. Of particular importance is the volume of export of Yugoslav consumer goods: 28 million dollars worth of footwear, 12 million dollars worth of furniture and 10 million dollars worth of woollen knitwear.

The most important items in the list of the imports from the Soviet Union are coal for coking, coke, rolled goods, products of the steel and iron industry, crude iron, naphtha derivatives, aluminium, tin, nickel ferro-alloys, asbestos, and caoutchouc. For the various industrial projects in the field of mining, power sources and ferrous metallurgy, to be constructed in Yugoslavia in the coming five years, the Soviet Union will deliver complete equipment to the total value of 95 million dollars.

On the other hand the new agreement does not provide for the export of Yugoslav agricultural products in large quantities. But even so, the extensive volume of Yugoslav

industrial products, especially of equipment and consumer goods, planned for export enhances the value of the agreement, for it enables producers to set up long-term production schedules. This is an element which gives every kind of interstate economic co-operation the character of stability and lasting value. The changes in the structures of the Yugoslav exports which have been taking place in the last few years facilitate the establishment of stable basic proportions for both long-term co-operation and regional orientation in foreign trade. Industrial production has thus strengthened its dominating position in exports and secured its own progress and capacity of participating in economic co-operation at a higher level. (The share of products with a high level of craftsmanship is almost 60 per cent of the total volume of Yugoslav exports.)

In volume and structure, the planned exchange of goods between Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. constitutes a significant change in comparison with the previous scope of co-operation. The annual rate of growth in the exchange of goods will amount to 16 or 17 per cent, which means that in the course of the coming five years the U.S.S.R. will hold a more important place than before in Yugoslav foreign trade. Good conditions for these prospects are offered, not only by the geographical entity and the level of development of the Soviet market, but also owing to the fact that the two economic structures complete each other. From the point of view of consumption the U.S.S.R. market can cover almost the whole structure of Yugoslav exports, while for the supplies needed by the Yugoslav economy the U.S.S.R. can be an important source of raw materials, equipment and semi-finished goods. The new agreement reflects the realistic opportunities of the two economies for long-term economic co-operation within this scope.

It is beyond doubt that the new agreement is a reflection of the reciprocal wish to widen economic co-operation and to establish it on a long-term basis just as it is beyond doubt that if both sides fulfil correctly their obligations success and mutual advantage will result.

N. O.

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Economic Problems of Asia

— 17 th meeting of the U N Economic Commission for Asia —

By M. STOJILJKOVIC

The 17th meeting of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia (ECAFE), held in New Delhi, had comprehensive agenda which included a large variety of problems, but most of the time was devoted to the question of regional cooperation in various fields.

In its thirteen years of work on outstanding problems, ECAFE has been giving increasingly greater attention to regional problems. Problems which, at one time, affected only individual countries, have become regional in character, and the member countries are making greater efforts to develop their own resources, to improve their technical abilities, and to harmonize their endeavours to promote economic development.

Owing to awareness of the integrative character of the region, the necessity of regional economic cooperation was early formulated for the first time at the Commission's meeting in Bangkok last year, when the Commission passed a resolution appealing to all member states to improve and increase their mutual assistance, particularly in the development of industry and trade.

This resolution, which was the result of the unanimous view that economic development can be accelerated by joint efforts, in fact served as a guide for the work of the Commission's meeting in New Delhi this year.

Considering the general economic situation in Asia, the commission concluded at this meeting that in most countries further economic progress had been made in 1960, although the rate of expansion had been slightly lower than in 1959, a year which had been preceded by a poor harvest and a decrease in industrial production.

Agricultural production, which had grown by about 7 percent in 1958-59, increased by only 1 percent in 1959-60, and very small increases are expected in 1960-61.

In 1958, industrial production in the ECAFE countries increased by only 1 percent, which was the lowest rate of expansion in the postwar period. In 1959, however, industrial output increased by 19 percent, and in the first half of 1960 by a further 15 percent.

Although the terms of trade in the first six months of 1960 were 4 percent more favourable than in the same period of the preceding year, decreases in the prices of exports in the second half of the year neutralized this improvement, and foreign-trade transactions were not improved at all. In 1960, the imports of these countries were greater than their exports, so that they had to rely on foreign assistance in solving their deficit problems which, in spite of all import restrictions and export stimuli, were not alleviated to any appreciable extent.

A report issued by the ECAFE Secretariat emphasized that, with the exception of a few countries, the internal economic stability of the region continued to be maintained. Delegates

to the meeting in New Delhi, however, expressed their anxiety over the slow pace of agricultural development. The Secretariat's long-term estimates of personal spending and food consumption in the region showed that agricultural production was not at all satisfactory. In comparison with the prewar period, the level of consumption increased only slightly, and this increase, too, was made possible by large imports. Otherwise, the per capita food production was still below the prewar level.

During the debate on international trade, anxiety was expressed over the instability caused by sharp fluctuations in exports of raw materials, and the delegates stated that efforts should be made to eliminate the difficulties which seriously obstructed the work of the underdeveloped countries in the United Nations.

Fear of the consequences of various plans of regional integration, particularly of the EEZ and EFTA groups, was expressed in the speeches of many delegates. However, all received, with some relief, the assurances of the British and French delegations that the liberal policy in trade with the ECAFE member-countries would not be abandoned.

A number of delegates stated that, in negotiations on customs tariffs with developed countries, underdeveloped States were not able to achieve satisfactory results, partly because they were not in a position to offer higher tariff concessions, and partly because their more developed trade partners imposed various import restrictions. As a result of this, it was said at the meeting that now solutions should be sought which would pay due attention to the obligations of industrially developed countries towards the underdeveloped members of the region.

This problem is all the more serious since, owing to the present economic structure of the ECAFE countries, their trade with States outside the region is much greater (about 67 percent) than with the members of the region itself (about 33 percent).

In the imports of capital goods and in all matters of technical assistance, most of the ECAFE countries are forced to turn to the developed industrial states. Therefore, various forms of integration in the ECAFE area cannot solve all the problems encountered in the present phase of economic development. In New Delhi, the Commission stated that joint actions on a sub-regional basis could stimulate and accelerate development, and it recommended that joint industrial projects should be built on the basis of harmonized plans of development of individual branches of industry. In this contest, it was pointed out that such projects should supplement and not supplant national plans of industrial development. Recommendations were made for various forms of regional economic cooperation, and the Commission emphasized the view that regional cooperation should not seek to create a bloc of states.

It was expected that in this way greater opportunities for more intensive inter-regional trade would be created. It was therefore recommended that these problems should be considered from a practical rather than from a theoretical or doctrinal point of view.

The idea of the planned development of national economies was wholly approved, and sixteen ECAFE member-countries have already drawn up their plans which, however, are quite dissimilar, both in method and in degree of coverage.

Supporting the view that the problems of economic development should be approached in a planned way, the Commission recommended that highlevel delegations should be sent to the conference of Asian economic planning specialists to be held in New Delhi, in September 1961, so as to enable this conference to make — by means of discussions, conclusions and recommendations — the greatest possible contribution to the solving of the problems of the planned development of economically backward countries.

Many concrete recommendations were made in regard to the problems of the development of rural areas, since the experience of some ECAFE member-countries had shown that in conditions characterized by the backwardness of villages, over-population and rapid growth of the population — problems which affect the whole region — some of these problems could be successfully solved by joint action. Particularly significant were the following recommendations: that the programmes of rural development should call for democratic decentralization and encourage "planning from below"; that these programmes should be included in the general National plans; that the local government should be strengthened; that ownership relations in agriculture should be solved so as to stimulate bigger production; and that the farmers should be supplied with machinery they could operate easily.

Among the conclusions reached, special mention should be made of the decision to draw up a geological map of Asia and the Far East, and the decision to hold another symposium on the problem of developing national oil industries in Teheran next year.

The delegates to the Economic Commission for Asia in Delhi further stated that the preliminary work on the big hydro-electric and irrigation project on the Mekong River was developing satisfactorily, and they made recommendations concerning the building of individual sections of the trans-continental road from Saigon to Istambul.

The application of the resolution passed at last year's session of the United Nations General Assembly on the decentralization of the United Nations economic activity and on the strengthening of regional commissions will strengthen the work of ECAFE. But the problem of funds remains unsolved. The inherited backwardness of the region, the rapid growth of the population and its low capital accumulation are problems which obstruct progress. If one bears in mind the different ways in which the solving of development problems and the application of recommendations made in ECAFE are approached, it is easy to understand the members of this organization who say that concrete activity does not come up to the discussions and the ideas voiced in ECAFE.

Most of the economic aid which the ECAFE countries receive is granted on a bilateral basis and for defined projects. For the application of the joint ECAFE programmes the member-countries must, for the moment, rely on their own limited resources and on the equally limited contributions and assistance of various United Nations agencies and other international organizations.

The problems which face the ECAFE underdeveloped countries are of a complex and fundamental nature. In fact, these countries are fighting against age-long backwardness. As an organization for the exchange of ideas and for the coordination of joint actions, ECAFE has produced good results. But adequate funds must be secured for the application of more extensive plans made possible by the internal circumstances in each individual country. For this reason, a number of delegations at the New Delhi meeting referred to the recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly that the developed countries should increase their contributions, emphasizing that the greater part of economic assistance should be channelled through the United Nations.

The speeches which the delegates of the big powers made at this meeting resounded as echoes of bloc bargaining and did not offer any new ideas. The presence of various elements of bloc or power politics in ECAFE is also due to the fact that some members of the organization belong to military alliances, and so uphold bloc conceptions.

Delegations of twenty-eight full and associate member-countries of ECAFE took part in the New Delhi meeting. This meeting was also attended by observers from Europe, and by representatives of thirteen international agencies and nineteen non-governmental organizations, which showed that there is world-wide interest in work and problems of ECAFE.

The fact that the People's Republic of China, the People's Republic of Mongolia, North Korea and North Vietnam are not members of ECAFE is detrimental to the organization and its aims. These four countries (10 million square kilometres, with 700 million inhabitants), with their economic potential and growing needs would help increase exchange of commodities and accelerate the development of economic cooperation in the whole region.

MANKIND

(Chief Editor: Rammanohar Lohia)

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ADDRESS:

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HYDERABAD — A. P. INDIA.

Subscription Rates: — Annual — Rs. 10/-;
U.K. — 25 Sh.; U.S.A. — \$ 4; Single copy —
— Re. 1/-; U.K. 2 Sh 6 d; U.S.A. 35 c.

REMUNERATION IN PUBLIC SERVICES

By Milan JOVANOVIĆ

Whereas the past ten-year period since the introduction of the system of workers' self-management in Yugoslavia has been marked by an intensive growth of the economy, as a result of which Yugoslavia is today included among the countries with the fastest rate of industrial development in the world, in part of the public services, including the state administration, development has not been nearly as intensive and rapid, particularly with regard to material and social relations. In effect, while the economy has long since developed an effective system of distribution according to the results of the work of each individual within the framework of the income of the entire collective, the public services have only just begun to abandon a system of financing, remuneration and management which has proved incapable of stimulating any greater interest among the working collective in the successful functioning and advancement of a particular service. Until 1960, all public services were treated in a uniform manner with regard to the system of payment, the promotion of employees, the method of financing etc. The Law on Public Employees adopted in 1957 prescribed the salaries and settled other matters relating to employees according to a centralized system, on the basis predominantly formal criteria, such as school qualifications, length of service, etc. The financing of public services was effected through fixed budgets, strictly determined for definite purposes, while the working collectives took little or no part in the management of these services. This, understandably, led to a disparity in the position of people employed in the economy and those employed in public services, both in respect to the amount of salaries and the democracy of internal relations. For example, the salaries of highly-skilled workers employed in the economy are 33 per cent higher than the salaries of the same category of employees in the federal bodies and the state administration. Whereas in the economy it was possible to raise the personal incomes of office employees and workers in accordance with the income achieved and the increased cost of living, the system of budgetary financing made this impossible in the public services. Consequently, there presented itself as a very important social problem, the need for coordinating these internal relations in the public services with the development of the economic system and the basic aim that distribution according to work be accepted as a universal principle.

The first step to this end was the adoption of the Law on Budgets and Financing of Self-Governing Institutions in January last year, whereby the financing of these institutions through budgets was replaced by a new and more flexible system of independent financing. The system of functioning of self-governing institutions in the social services was based on the principles of economic functioning, and the formation of personal incomes was made directly dependent upon the income achieved by the institution as a whole and the results

of the work of each individual. In accordance with these principles, a number of laws were passed which made it possible for individual social services to be converted into self-governing institutions. These laws included the Basic Law on School Financing, the General Law on the Organization of the Health Service, the Law on the Method of Financing Scientific Institutions and the Law on Banks. Several more laws are now being prepared, as for example, on social insurance, the State Insurance Institute, and others.

The basic feature of all these laws is that they make it possible for the social services to function as economic organizations and to regulate accordingly the system of remuneration, whose basic principle is remuneration according to work. Self-governing institutions are completely independent in distributing the income achieved between personal incomes, material expenditures, investments, etc. It thus happens that "our worker in a factory or on a state farm, just like a doctor in a hospital, a teacher in a school, a scientist in an institute or an artist in his studio, is now in a position to obtain his income through free work at his working post, which means that he not only determines his own "salary", but that he also contributes towards the means needed for the further development of the material conditions of his work."

A worker is now able to develop his factory himself, and is, moreover, interested in doing so in much the same way as a doctor, a teacher and a scientist are interested in advancing their respective institutions.¹

As a result of these changes it has been possible in the public services, too, "to free work", to abolish hired relations and create a new attitude towards work. The activity of each individual in the new system is no longer confined to his working post. He is interested in the work and success of the institution as a whole, since, ultimately, it is upon its successful functioning of the institution that the amount of his personal income depends. And it is this precise fact that will encourage initiative, suggestions and plans for the advancement of the work of public services and for more effective and comprehensive methods of satisfying the growing needs of the population. Moreover, it will help eliminate that bureaucratic mentality which sometimes led to the isolation of institutions of the public services, and to a careless attitude towards the beneficiaries of their services.

The new system of functioning of social services on economic principles, and the new system of distribution, necessitate the maximum engagement of the entire collective, with a view

¹ This is a quotation taken from the report Mijalko Todorović, Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council submitted at a session of the Executive of the Federal Board of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia on February 23, 1961.

to ensuring the successful functioning of the institution. Today it is no longer possible to maintain the practice of limited participation of representatives of the working collective in the bodies of social self-management in their institution, but it is necessary further to democratize the methods of management and administration of public services. Rigid, hierarchical relations in administration, the principle of subordination and the "chief" mentality are giving way to a spirit of mutual cooperation and respect for the opinions, proposals and criticisms of each individual. Accordingly, it is becoming increasingly apparent that it is impossible to ensure a consistent implementation of the mentioned principles of financing and remuneration without changing at the same time the position of the employees, for eventually it is impossible to pay an employee according to the result of his work if he is not given a chance of influencing decisions on matters directly affecting it, i. e., if the working collective is not permitted to exert a real influence on the activity of the body or institution. It is considered that the working collective should be consulted on matters relating to internal distribution in the public services, that it should take part in the adoption of decisions concerning the admission of new employees, the dismissal of employees, the appointment of employees to individual working posts, the systematization of working posts, the internal organization and measures for the promotion of the service, specialized training, working discipline, special rewards, over-time work, etc. Decisions on the use of means intended for joint consumption by the working collective should also be included. The exercise such functions will certainly necessitate the possession by a working collective of its own body of management in the form of a council which would be set up in the same way as the workers' councils in the economic organizations.

In this respect, for understandable reasons, the state administration must be considered separately from the bodies of social services, whose functioning is based on the principles of independent financing. The state administration, on account of its specific tasks and greater subordination to the representative bodies, will have a somewhat different system of payment, method of financing and forms of participation of the working collective in the functioning of the institution, though these too will have to undergo considerable changes.

The basis of the new system of payment in the state administration will be the working post and the results of the work. The new system, therefore, provides that the income of employees should consist of one basic (guaranteed) part, conditional on the working post, and no longer dependent on school qualifications, length of service and similar elements, and another additional (variable) part, depending on the results of the work of an employee at a particular working post. For this purpose, the description, evaluation and classification of all working posts in the bodies of the state administration are to be made according to the scope and complexity of the tasks, so that each class will entail a corresponding payment group. The criterion for the distribution of the variable part of the salary will be determined by the institutions themselves, through their regulations. The entire working collective and its bodies of management will take part in the drawing up of these regulations. It is groundless to fear that the new system will neglect school qualifications and favour unskilled employees, since when evaluating the working posts the definite school qualifications needed for the successful accomplishment of the tasks will be taken into consideration.

The new system, thus conceived, actually means transition to remuneration according to output in the bodies of the state administration as well, wherever this is possible. It is therefore expected that, in line with the advancement of the new system and the finding of appropriate criteria for measuring output, the variable part of the salary will gradually increase, at the expense of that part of the salary which is guaranteed.

Another very important characteristic of the new system of payment in the state administration is that it will be completely decentralized, which means that the political-territorial units will be able to follow an independent policy with regard to the salaries of their employees in accordance with their needs and capabilities. This will lead to different salaries in individual communes, but it is essential that it will not be possible to go below the fixed minimum.

All these changes are intended to stimulate public services, in the new system of distribution and remuneration, towards further modernization and improvement of their methods of functioning, and thus enable them to meet better the daily requirements of the citizens.

DOCUMENTS

COMMUNIQUE ON PRESIDENT TITO'S VISIT TO MOROCCO

At the conclusion of the visit of the President of Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia to the Kingdom of Morocco, the following joint communiqué was released in Rabat on April 1, 1961:

"At the invitation of Hassan II, king of Morocco, Josip Broz Tito, President of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, and Madame Jovanka Broz, paid an official visit to the Kingdom of Morocco from April 1 to 6, 1961.

"President Tito was accompanied by Lazar Koliševski, President of the Macedonian People's Assembly, Veljko Mićunović, State Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and Leo Mates, Secretary General of the President of the Republic.

"During President Tito's visit the two heads of state and their collaborators exchanged views on the further development of friendly co-operation between the two countries and on international issues of common interest. The talks were

conducted in the atmosphere of cordiality and understanding which characterizes relations between Yugoslavia and Morocco.

"President Tito and King Hassan II expressed anxiety at the deterioration of the international situation, and they expressed their conviction that it was absolutely necessary to settle international issues by peaceful negotiation and not by reliance on force. They agreed that the development of constructive and equal co-operation among all nations regardless of their size, social and economic system, level of development, racial or other differences was the precondition for the preservation of peace.

"The heads of the two states stressed that every nation had the right to decide on its own internal development in full liberty, and in keeping with conditions which were the most suitable for it, without any pressure from abroad. They agreed that foreign intervention and violation of the principle of non-interference with the internal affairs of other states

cially on the territory of Africa and Asia, hampered the development of international co-operation and endangered world peace.

"President Tito and the King of Morocco emphasized that the existence of great differences between economically developed and insufficiently developed countries constituted a serious danger to international stability. They shared the opinion that the rendering of economic and technical assistance to insufficiently developed countries was in the interests of countries and peoples, as well as in the interests of the world economy as a whole. According to the heads of the two states, this assistance should be rendered through the United Nations Organization, or through bilateral agreements, without political or other conditions which might impair, in any way, the independence, sovereignty and equal rights of the states that received this assistance.

"The two heads of state found that the continuation of arms race constituted a permanent danger to peace and that it was the duty of all states, big and small, to exert their maximum efforts to arrest further armament, to put a permanent ban on nuclear tests, and to begin negotiations for reaching an agreement on general and complete disarmament. They emphasized their determination to continue such efforts in the future and to support all constructive initiative in this direction.

"The heads of the two states confirmed their support of the resolutions of the Casablanca Conference, which were of great importance for the liquidation of colonialism and elimination of its consequences, as well as for the strengthening of the independence and the advancement of the cooperation, solidarity and unity of all African states.

"The Yugoslav President and the King of Morocco firmly supported the struggle of the Algerian people for freedom and independence, and they agreed that the Algerian people's right to self-determination should be recognized without delay. They condemned efforts which have hitherto been made to prevent by force of arms, the Algerian people from attaining independence, which jeopardized peace in this part of Africa and in the world in general. Finding that the solution of the Algerian question could be achieved only if the right to self-determination were effectively applied, the heads of the two states welcomed the efforts made in this direction.

"Expressing their satisfaction at the achievement of independence of a number of African countries, the two heads

of state agreed that it was absolutely and urgently necessary to secure the independence of all peoples still under colonial subjugation. They strongly condemned, as extremely dangerous, all attempts of the colonial powers to re-impose by intervention, pressure, and interference with the internal affairs of the newly liberated countries, their own domination, and to frustrate the strengthening of the independence and normal development of these countries, with a view to shattering their territorial integrity. In this connection the two heads of state emphasized that the full liquidation of colonialism was also an urgent and indispensable task of the whole international community.

"The two heads of state condemned the attempts of the colonial and imperialist powers to check the independent development of the Congo and to shatter its territorial integrity. They found that the settlement of the Congolese crisis could be attained only by the urgent withdrawal of the colonialists, by the elimination of all foreign interference, by the punishment of the organizers and perpetrators of the assassination of Patrice Lumumba and other Congolese leaders, by respecting the independence, integrity and unity of the Congo, and by rendering possible the normal work of the legitimate institutions of the Congo, in the first place of the central government, headed by Antoine Gizenga.

"The Yugoslav President and the King of Morocco carefully analyzed the results hitherto achieved in the co-operation of their countries in the political, economic, technical, cultural and other fields, and they noted with satisfaction that friendly relations between Yugoslavia and Morocco had developed successfully in recent years. At the same time they observed that there existed a mutual desire and favourable opportunities for the further development of extensive co-operation between the two countries.

"In order to strengthen still more the friendly relations between Yugoslavia and Morocco; the Yugoslav President and the King of Morocco agreed that new efforts should be made to increase trade exchange, as well as co-operation in the scientific and technical fields, including the sending of technicians, doctors, engineers and other experts, and the training and advanced study of Yugoslav and Moroccan personnel in the two countries.

"King Hassan II accepted with pleasure President Tito's invitation to pay an official visit to Yugoslavia."

DECLARATION AND "WHITE PAPER" ON ALBANIA

At a press conference on April 7 Drago Kunc, spokesman of the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, read a Declaration by the Yugoslav Government on Albania's hostile policy towards Yugoslavia; and a "White Paper" on this matter published by the Yugoslav Government, was distributed.

The Declaration reads as follows:

Faced with the policy which the People's Republic of Albania has been pursuing for years, and concerned about the future of relations between Yugoslavia and Albania, the Yugoslav Government has been compelled to publish a "White Paper" on the Albanian Government's hostile policy towards the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

In policy towards Yugoslavia the Government of the People's Republic of Albania has not observed the basic principles of relations between states laid down in the UN Charter: principles which every government aware of its responsibility towards the international community is bound to take into account. Hence the Yugoslav Government wishes, in publishing a "White Paper", to draw the attention of the governments of the UNO member countries, of UNO itself, and of the world public, to the extremely unsatisfactory condition of Yugoslav-Albanian relations, which is the consequence of the anti-Yugoslav policy of the Albanian Government,

and to the permanent efforts the Yugoslav Government has exerted in vain, with a view to normalizing mutual relations.

The unpacific policy of the Albanian Government is reflected in declarations of the highest representatives of the government and political leaders, as well as in daily political and propagandist activity against Yugoslavia, in interference with her internal affairs, in the organizing of extensive intelligence and subversive actions against Yugoslavia's national sovereignty and state integrity, in the impeding of all aspects of bilateral co-operation, in attempts at disturbing relations between Yugoslavia and third countries, in hampering the normal work of the Yugoslav diplomatic staff in Tirana, in persecution of the Yugoslav citizens resident in Albania and in various other similar actions, and in the absence of the minimum of good will to improve relations between the two countries.

This policy of the Albanian Government leads not only to extremely strained relations between two neighbouring countries but at the same time poisons relations in the Balkans, in obstructing all the efforts which are being made to strengthen peace and settle conditions in this part of the world.

The highest Albanian state and political leaders keep stressing that the fight against Yugoslavia is one of the principal tasks and unchangeable principles of the state and party policy of the People's Republic of Albania, which is in flagrant contradiction with their occasional assurances that they are guided

in their policy by the principles of peaceful co-existence and by a wish for international co-operation.

The manifestations of the Albanian Government's hostile policy towards Yugoslavia were especially disquieting in February 1961, at the Fourth Congress of the Albanian Workers' Party which, as is known, is the political force in power in Albania.

The Government of the People's Republic of Yugoslavia, while publishing in the "White Paper" documents on the hostile policy of the People's Republic of Albania towards the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, expresses its readiness to establish good neighbourly relations with the People's Republic of Albania. To attain this it is indispensable:

— that the Government of the People's Republic of Albania should observe the UNO Charter in its relationship with Yugoslavia, as well as the generally accepted norms of behaviour in interstate relations;

— that it should discontinue hostile propaganda and subversive actions against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia;

— that it should abolish discriminatory measures and renders it possible for the Yugoslav diplomatic staff to work normally; and

— that it should cease all other actions which obstruct the normalization of mutual relations.

The Government of the People's Republic of Yugoslavia is deeply convinced that this would serve the vital interests of the peoples of both countries, as well as the interests of peace and peaceful co-operation among the states on the wider territory of the Balkans.

Communiqué on Souvana Phouma's Visit to Belgrade

The publication of a joint communiqué on the Yugoslav-Laotian political talks, and a press conference held by Prince Souvana Phouma, on April 13 concluded the official visit of the Laotian delegation, who had stayed two days in Yugoslavia as guests of the Yugoslav Government.

The joint communiqué reads as follows:

"At the invitation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Prince Souvana Phouma, head of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of Laos, accompanied by his collaborators, stayed on an official visit in Yugoslavia from April 11 to 13, 1961.

"During this visit, Prince Souvana Phouma and his collaborators conducted talks with Edvard Kardelj, Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council, and with other leading statesmen. Prince Souvana Phouma visited a number of scientific institutions in Belgrade and in its surroundings.

"In the course of the talks an open exchange of views took place, first of all on the problem of Laos, in an atmosphere of cordiality and mutual understanding, and opinions found to be similar on many points.

"Both sides agreed that the application of the resolutions of the Geneva Conference of 1954 on the national unity integrity and neutrality of Laos was the only way out of the crisis in this country. Any interference from abroad was not only in contradiction to the mentioned resolutions, but constituted the chief cause of the present conflict in Laos. At the same time it meant a potential danger of expansion of the conflict in Laos, which would imperil peace in this area and in the world in general.

"Both sides found that constructive efforts have been exerted in recent times with a view to solving the crisis in Laos in a peaceful way, and they agreed that urgent practical measures were necessary.

"The Head of the Council of the Kingdom of Laos expounded the alarming situation in Laos at present and the views of his Government concerning the settling of this situation by convening as soon as possible a conference of fourteen countries to deal with the problem of Laos, so as to reach, in co-operation with the legitimate government of Laos an agreement to free the people of Laos from intervention from

broad, and to facilitate the free internal development of independent Laos.

"Vice-President Edvard Kardelj, in conformity with the stand taken by the Yugoslav government up to now, fully shared the views expressed and promised, in the name of the Yugoslav government, full support for the government of Souvana Phouma and the people of Laos in the defense of their legitimate rights.

"During the talks both sides reviewed opportunities for future co-operation between the two countries, and agreed to return to this question as soon as peace was restored in Laos."

Points from the Press Conferences

On March 30 and April 7, Drago Kunc spokesman of the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, held press conferences for Yugoslav and foreign journalists and answered a number of questions on current world political problems.

President Tito's way — Asked to comment on the strange conformity of criticism from the "extreme left and right" on President Tito's tour of Africa, Drago Kunc answered: "We are not surprised that President Tito's tour, which is in fact a real contribution to the policy of peace and co-operation as well as a sign of support for the African people in their struggle for independence and against colonialism, was made the subject of tendentious and calumnious attacks misrepresenting the purposes of this journey, attacks which came at the same time from some reactionary circles in the West and from China and Albania or were to be found in the newspaper of the Indonesian Communist Party. This was an occasion when extremes met. The DPA reporter in Togo wrote tendentially about President Tito's visit and the Indonesian Communist party press used this piece of writing. Previously, the French "Aurore" wrote in similar vein, and this was made use of by the Chinese and Albanian press as an opportunity for a new attack on President Tito's tour and, on the whole Yugoslav policy of co-operation. Such writing only shows that for those who look at everything through the prism of narrow bloc policy there is no advantage in strengthening the independent policy of equality and which advocate international action by those countries which do not want to serve the interest of the existing blocs."

Koča Popović in Canada — "We are convinced that the talks between Koča Popović, Yugoslav State Secretary for Foreign Affairs and prominent Canadian statesmen will promote the further extension of bilateral co-operation and help to resolve international questions of common interest."

Agreement with U.S.S.R. — "Negotiations with the U.S.S.R. were conducted in a spirit of mutual understanding and both sides showed a desire to put the exchange of goods on the basis of long term trade. The exchange of goods in 1960 amounted to 107 million dollars, while for the period from 1960 to 1965 the total value of goods exchanged is expected to be 800 million dollars. The new agreement balances imports and exports."

Artuković's extradition — "An article in an American journal of international law, which in its January number treated the question of Artuković's extradition, shows that those with a serious regard for law in America have basically the same view on this matter as the Yugoslav government itself."

APRIL 7

Yugoslav Government's Statement and the "White Paper" — "It is no secret that the Albanian Government's hostile policy was for years inspired and endorsed by Stalin, and that even today it enjoys the support of similar circles in different countries. It is important that we are forced to state that the systematic hostile policy of the Albanian Government towards Yugoslavia is a fact."

Albanian Espionage — "The intelligence activity of Ulchinak, Third Secretary in the Albanian Legation in Belgrade, was proved at the public trial of members of the Albanian Intelligence Service in Ohrid. In view of this, he was denied hospitality in this country. The Yugoslav Legation in Tirana and the

onian Legation in Belgrade now have the same number staff."

writing of Czechoslovak Press.— "The Czechoslovak papers: 'Race', 'Obraza Lidu', 'Predvoj', 'Slovački preglej' and 'Philosophical Review' have published a number of articles attacking Yugoslav home and foreign policy. The campaign being conducted under the guise of an alleged ideological struggle presented, roughly as follows: 'Kind Uncle Sam is distributing presents to Yugoslav schools and is feeding two million Yugoslav children, and this, of course, must somehow be paid back by the Yugoslav revisionists, for it is justly said that he who pays the piper calls the tune.' How well this deep political discussion illustrates the philosophical level of authors."

Unfavourable Working Conditions for Yugoslav Diplomats in Czechoslovakia.— Asked if he knew what steps Yugoslavia intended to take in order to protect the staff of her embassy in Prague and the consulate in Bratislava, whose normal work had been made impossible, Drago Kunc replied: "After the hearings, interventions and protests in which we requested the Czechoslovak Government to alter its conduct towards our diplomats, the Yugoslav Government cannot, of course, tolerate this unequal situation any longer and is therefore compelled to apply measures of strict reciprocity."

Third Pan-African Conference.— "This conference proved to be another constructive meeting of representatives of liberated Africa and African liberation movements, contributing towards their unity and the settlement of important problems of the African continent."

Meeting of Warsaw Pact.— "We consider that the part of the communiqué referring to coexistence and stressing the need for solving international questions by way of negotiation, is worthy of attention. Such tendencies have always received our support and we shall continue to support them in the future too."

Meetings and Talks

AT OFFICIAL LEVEL

President Tito in Morocco.— President Tito and members of the Yugoslav state delegation visited Morocco from April 5 to 6, where the President had political talks with King Hassan II.

President Tito in Tunisia— President Tito paid an official visit to Tunisia from April 10 to 16, where he had political talks with President Bourgiba, and made a speech in the Tunisian Parliament.

Visit of Souvana Phouma.— Prince Souvana Phouma, the Lao Prime Minister, visited Yugoslavia from April 11 to 13 as the guest of the Yugoslav Government. During his stay in Belgrade, he had meetings and political talks with outstanding representatives of Yugoslav political and public life.

Miloš Popović in London.— On his way back from New York, Miloš Popović State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, paid a private visit to London from April 7 to 12. He made a courtesy call on Mr Edward Heath, member of the British Government acting on behalf of the absent Foreign Secretary, Lord Home.

Meeting of Council of Interparliamentary Union.— A meeting of the Council of the Interparliamentary Union was held in Geneva on April 8 and 9. The meeting was attended on behalf of the Yugoslav group by Maks Baće and Aleš Bebler, people's deputies. The Yugoslav representatives proposed a resolution on the principles which should be respected in relations between states.

OF THE TRADE UNIONS

Visitor from Northern Rhodesia.— Mr M. B. Cama, leader of the North Rhodesian Trade Union of Building Workers and Woodcutters, arrived in Belgrade at the end of March for a ten-day visit to Yugoslavia to establish contact and cooperation with the Yugoslav Trade Union of Building Workers and Woodcutters.

Visit of Soviet Trade Union Delegation.— A Soviet Trade Union Delegation led by Vasilij Prohorov, Secretary of the Central Council, stayed in Yugoslavia in the first half of April, and toured Macedonia, Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia. The

members of the delegation had talks in the central councils of the trade union federations in these republics on the social and political activity of Yugoslav trade unions.

Italian Agriculturalists in Yugoslavia.— At the invitation of the Central Council of the Yugoslav Trade Union Confederation, members of an Italian agricultural study organization visited Yugoslavia in the latter part of March and the first half of April. They studied Yugoslavia's general agricultural policy and toured a number of state farms and cooperatives.

Yugoslav Educationalists in Great Britain.— A Yugoslav educational delegation headed by Milan Mirković, President of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Educational and Scientific Workers Union, attended a congress of the British Teachers' Union held in Brighton from April 1 to 6, as guests of the British educationalists.

OTHER CONTACTS

Yugoslav Delegation in Geneva.— A meeting of the European Economic Commission, which began in Geneva on April 11 and will last until April 28, is attended by a Yugoslav delegation headed by Bogdan Crnobrnja, Assistant State Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The meeting is to discuss the economic situation in Europe in the past year and analyse the work of the Commission's bodies during that period.

Austrian Socialist in Belgrade.— Dr Karl Czermec, leader of the Austrian Socialist Party, stayed in Belgrade from April 3 to 11 as the guest of the Institute for the Study of the Workers' Movement. He gave a lecture and had talks with members of the Institute, and was received by Veljko Vlahović, Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia.

Congress in Milan.— The Second Congress for the History of the Resistance Movement in Europe during the Second World War recently ended in Milan. Among the 200 delegates from 22 countries were representatives from Yugoslavia.

Negotiations and Agreements

THE ECONOMY

Agreement with the USSR.— A trade agreement for the 1961—1965 period and a protocol on trade for 1961 was signed between Yugoslavia and the USSR in Belgrade on March 30. The agreement which provides for trade exchanges to the amount of about 800 million dollars both ways, was signed for Yugoslavia by Vujica Gajinović, Assistant President of the Foreign Trade Committee, and for the Soviet delegation by Mihail Komanović Kuzmin, Assistant Minister of Foreign Trade.

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION

Yugoslav-U.S.A.R. Agreement.— An agreement on cooperation in the field of nuclear energy between Yugoslavia and the U. A. R. was signed in Cairo on April 4. The agreement provides for cooperation between corresponding institutions of the two countries in the field of nuclear research and the processing of nuclear raw materials.

Yugoslav-Hungarian Protocol.— The Fourth Session of the Yugoslav-Hungarian Commission for Technical Cooperation ended in Budapest on March 30 with the signing of a protocol on the programme of such cooperation between the two countries.

CULTURE

Yugoslav Delegation in Vienna.— Members of a Yugoslav cultural delegation arrived in Vienna on April 5. They are to negotiate with Austrian representatives for the restoration to Yugoslavia of archives and other cultural possessions, on the basis of the agreement on restitution of 1923 and the Protocol of 1958.

News in Brief

ECONOMY

National income— The real increase of total national income in 1960 amounted to 7.5% more than in the previous year. Real income economy increased during the same period by about 17%.

Industrial production — In the course of 1960 the volume of industrial production increased by 15% in relation to 1959.

Cattle-breeding — During 1960 progress was made in the production of cattle-breeding and its volume increased by 8% compared to 1959.

New workers — The number of new workers increased by 0.7% in 1960 in relation to the year before.

Foreign trade exchange — Foreign trade exchange in Yugoslavia reached the level of 418.000.000.000 dinars that is to say, it increased by 20 per cent in relation to 1959.

MINING

Copper — The gross production value of the Bor mining basin in East Serbia, which was 24 milliards last year will increase to 31 milliard dinars this year.

Sulphuric acid — This year the new factory in Bor for the production of sulphuric acid, with an annual capacity of 230,000 tons, will be put into operation, which means that Yugoslavia will be able to cease her imports of sulphuric acid.

AGRICULTURE

Spring sowing — This spring nearly 5 million hectares of soil for the spring sowing have already been ploughed.

YUGOSLAV ENTERPRISES ABROAD.

In India. The Yugoslav factories "Rade Končar", "Termo-elektro" and "Jugoturbina" have concluded a contract for the construction of a thermoelectric power plant in India. The value of the works to be carried out by the end of 1964, including the delivery and mounting of all plants, machines, apparatus and accessories, amounts to about two million dollars. Members of "Ingra", a Yugoslav Trade Association, have signed an agreement for the construction of the Durgapur coking plant in India, to the value of two million dollars. The same Association has concluded an agreement for the construction of a cement mill worth 1.4 million dollars, and a contract with the Government of West Bengal for the construction of the Yaldnaka hydro-electric power plant to the value of 350,000 dollars. The "Invest-Import" Enterprise of Belgrade will carry out the construction of the Brauni thermoelectric plant and of the Durgapur-Calcutta pipeline.

In Nepal. The Yugoslav firm "Ingra" has concluded a contract for the construction of the Trishchuli hydro-electric plant in Nepal, to the value of about 260,000 dollars.

In Ethiopia. "Ingra" has concluded a contract for the construction of a cement mill and two hydro-electric plants to the value of more than 2.1 million dollars. An agreement has been concluded for the economic development of the Province of Nabe Shabeli in Ethiopia and a preliminary report is being worked out.

In the Lebanon. The "Hidrogradnja" Enterprise of Sarajevo is completing the construction of the Karaun dam and the Marhabi tunnel in the Lebanon.

In Egypt. The "Geoistraživanja" Enterprise is working on the reinforcing of the old Assuan dam in Egypt. The value of the works is 1.7 million dollars.

EXPORT

Food Processing Machinery. In the course of 1960 about 4.5 million dollars worth of food processing machines and plants were exported to Ghana, Iran, Iraq, India and the U. A. R. **Rail Vehicles.** The Yugoslav rail-car industry doubled its exports last year, when it exported goods to the value of nearly 12.7 million dollars. Deliveries to the U. S. S. R. were 630 tank-cars, to the Democratic Republic of Germany 267 hopper trucks, and to Hungary 749 double-axled wagons for goods trains.

Shipbuilding. Last year the value of exports from shipyards reached nearly 19 million dollars. The deliveries included two cargo ships to Poland, one cargo ship each to Great Britain, Switzerland and Greece, and a tanker to Liberia.

Sports Boats. Of the 325 sports boats exported last year 316 were delivered to the U. S. A.

Political Diary

April 4 — A consultation on agriculture was held in Belgrade, with Svetozar Vukmanović, President of the Central Council of the Yugoslav Trade Union Confederation, in the chair. Reports were submitted by Dr Slavko Komar, Secretary for Agriculture in the Federal Executive Council, and Mika Šmiljak and Paško Romac, vice presidents of the Central Council of the Trade Union Confederation.

April 5 — The Permanent Conference of Towns held a consultation at which the financing of the building of flats as finished products was discussed.

April 7 — A meeting of the Committee for the Organization of Authority and the Administration of the Federal People's Assembly was held at which the report of the Federal Executive Council on its work in the past year was discussed.

Our New Contributor

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Review of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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THE REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Is a forum for the free exchange of ideas by Yugoslav and foreign authors in the domain of politics and economics.

Articles signed by their authors do not necessarily represent views of the Review.

The Review is published fortnightly in:

Serbo-Croat
English
German
French
Russian and
Spanish